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CHAPTER ONE Introduction 
Our demand is simple: apply free trade rules not only to those products that 
are of interest to the rich and powerful, but also to those products where poor 
countries have a proven comparative advantage. 
AMADOU TOUMANI TOURE AND BLAISE COMPAORE, 
presidents of Mali and Burkina Faso, respectively In a July 2003 op-ed in the New York Cf'imes titled ''Your Farm Subsidies Are Strangling Us," Toure and Compaore made cotton the poster child for dem­onstrating how negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO) failed to address "development." They charged that the hypocritical trade poli­cies of the United States and European Union contributed to the poverty faced by thousands of small farmers in West Africa. At the same time, they pointed to a broader crisis: the legitimacy of global rules that privileged Western firms and states was quickly unraveling. These West African leaders were not alone in posing this challenge. Bra­zil had filed a complaint against US cotton subsidies through the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body in 2002. With this challenge, Brazil made a simi­lar charge: if the United States and its powerful corporate allies wanted the rest of the world to abide by its rule-governed system of "free" trade, the rules would have to apply to everyone. In the eyes of many, the Brazil-US dispute would be a test of the legitimacy of the WTO. The WTO was launched in 1995 to create binding rules to establish a lib­eralized trading environment on the global stage. Leaders of Western coun­tries and international organizations insisted that a liberalized economy was in the best interests of the entire global community. The promise to countries in the global South was not just that neoliberal policies would in­crease trade, but that, in the words of WTO Director-General Renato Rug­giero, "most important of all, by opening their economies these countries accelerate their development'' (1998). These promises, however, soon proved empty. As Toure and Compaore 
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attest, the trade policies of the United States and the European Union have 
been deeply hypocritical. They have aggressively pursued liberalization in 
services such as banking, insurance, and telecommunications-sectors in 
which the North holds a clear competitive advantage-while continuing to 
protect their agricultural sectors where the global South could make gains. 
While WTO rules compel African cotton producers to compete in markets 
dominated by powerful Western corporations and to privatize their state 
trading enterprises, the United States has continued to pour billions of 
dollars into subsidies for their cotton growers and exporters. Rather than 
deliver development, this asymmetrical application of trade rules has de­
pressed global market prices for Southern export crops like cotton and al­
lowed the United States to dump its cheap farm commodities on liberalized 
markets in the South. 
The deep conflict over US cotton subsidies loomed large at the annual 
meetings of the International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC) that I at­
tended in September 2005. This conflict had been at the heart of the collapse 
of WTO negotiations in Cancun in 2003. Now, the ICAC, an international 
commodity organization, was meetingjust months before further wro ne­
gotiations in Hong Kong. Sitting in a session on government policy, I saw 
the Cancun stalemate reproduce itself before my eyes. Delegations from 
Brazil and the "Cotton-4" countries of West Africa (Mali, Burkina Faso, 
Benin, and Chad) pointed to US subsidies as "a blatant injustice" and called 
on the ICAC to issue a formal statement demanding their rapid elimination. 
The US delegation brushed off these charges, insisting that the ICAC ''was 
not a negotiating body'' and that they could not support such statements. 
While the US delegation wanted to avoid movement on the subsidy issue, 
they appeared to have a different priority for the ICAC meetings: to move 
toward an agreement on a single set of cotton quality standards, and a com­
mon instrument for measuring fiber quality, that would replace the existing 
mismatch of national standards and smooth global trade. The US Depart· 
ment of Agriculture (USDA) had been working with cotton fiber scientists 
in Germany to demonstrate that the standards and measurement system 
used in the United States could be extended on a global scale and still supply 
the reliable measurements demanded by the transnational merchants that 
dominated the trade. 
Resistance to the US proposal to extend their standards and measure­
ment system on a global stage was unambiguous. Officials from various 
African countries repeatedly raised concerns that the capital-intensive mea­
surement instrument used in the United States was not appropriate. for 
INTRODUCTION 3 countries in the global South. "Isn't there a moral duty to reduce the costs of implementing the system?" appealed a representative from Mozambique. Other delegations from the global South accused the USDA standards of be­ing biased toward US cotton. Fiber scientists tried to cast quality standards as technical and apolitical rules that merely served to reduce the transaction costs of trade. However, for firms and states from the global South, it ap­peared that even if subsidies were eliminated and a so-called "unregulated" market was achieved, these new rules would still stack the deck against the global South. A few days later, however, I discovered that it was not the challenge from ICAC delegates that most concerned the US government delegation and the cotton producers, textile manufacturers, and merchants that it represented. One afternoon I found myself sitting amongst an audience of cotton mer­chants-the most powerful actors in the cotton trade-at the parallel con­ference held by the merchant-dominated association, the International Cot­ton Association (ICA). For merchants, the ICAC was a forum to influence states and national policies. The ICA conference, on the other hand, was about packing in business meetings with clients from around the world and schmoozing over drinks in the hotel lobby. Few people actually attended the conference presentations. But on this particular afternoon, the presentation hall was crowded for a talk by a representative from China. Since the early 2000s, China had become a textile and apparel powerhouse. Importing close to 40 percent of all transnationally traded cotton, it had acquired both significant sway in the cotton market and the listening ears of the merchant community. A key issue in the presentation was quality inspection for cotton imported into China. The representative from a quasi-private Chinese trade association, the China Cotton Association, ran through a host of problems that the gov­ernment quality inspection office had found with recent imports, including seeds in cotton from Africa and rat excrement in cotton packing from the United States. As she continued down her list, a low grumbling could be heard from the crowd. Transnational merchants were looking for a piece of the Chinese pie, but this meant negotiating with the Chinese govern­ment and Chinese firms over trade rules -in this case, how cotton quality, and thus price, would be verified when cotton was imported into China. When the presentation was over, merchants jockeyed to ask questions but became unsettled by the Chinese representative's vague responses. Finally, a merchant from one of the largest cotton trading companies in the world jumped to his feet, and audibly frustrated, questioned the Chinese represen-
4 CHAPTER ONE tative: would clear rules be posted for quality inspections? The Chinese rep­resentative smiled, un.flustered, responding that rules would be posted on their website ... in Mandarin. A few groans and sarcastic laughter emerged from the crowd. While comforted by the fact that it wasn't just me who didn't under­stand the rules for trade into China, I was struck by the palpable anxiety surrounding these rules among representatives of powerful transnational merchant firms, a handful of who controlled about 50 percent of the trans­national cotton trade. Wandering back into the hotel lobby after the pre­sentation, I ran into several USDA representatives. As they debriefed the Chinese presentation, I saw that it had also put them on edge. They wanted the Chinese government to adopt their cotton quality standards, they ex­plained to me, and they would be heading to China to address this issue. Contestation over who makes the rules for the global economy-and who can enforce the rules-would not be easily resolved. 
* * * Conflicts in the cotton trade make this much clear: we are in an era of un­certainty over the rules that govern global economic integration. Histori­cally, Western firms and states have largely set the rules for global trade. But today they face new challenges with the shift to an Asia-centered economy. The wro is at a stalemate as a rising group of firms and states are question­ing the legitimacy of trade rules that privilege the West. At the same time, the Chinese state is raising the ire of powerful transnational corporations who can no longer simply impose the rules of the game. These are not struggles unique to the cotton trade. These new axes of conflict are rippling across the economy. In the controversial case of cen­sorship and cyber attacks between China and the global corporate giant Google, a representative from the Chinese Foreign Ministry warned that Google must adhere to China's laws and regulations if it wanted to access the growing Chinese market (Wong et al. 2010). Trade disputes between China and the United States over exports of tires, chickens, steel, and au­tos have multiplied (Cha 2010). Put simply, this is a period of hegemonic rivalry. The United States and China are competing on a multitude of fronts over which states and firms will claim the dominance and legitimacy neces­sary to set the rules governing the global capitalist system. Nowhere are these tensions more evident than in the sinimering stan­dards wars between China and the West. "Chinese businesses, govern-
INTRODUCTION 5 ment officials and experts have repeatedly enunciated a strategy that views standards as trade weapons," explains political scientist Scott Kennedy 
(2006:45), in part due to a view that Western firms and states have used standards "to solidify Western dominance of markets and force developing countries such as China to remain in an inferior position." Western firms and states have sounded alarms over Chinese efforts to set new standards not just for cotton and other agricultural products but also for a number of high-profile information and communication technologies, such as wireless security, cellular phones, and supply-chain management (Bach et al. 2006; Suttmeier and Yao 2004; Suttmeier et al. 2006). These are struggles not over whether global economic integration should advance, but over what kind of integration is desired and on whose terms in a period of hegemonic struggle. Despite deep conflicts, we also see new forms of engagement. Private, state, and civil society actors are rapidly con­structing new transnational governance institutions to tackle a wide range of issues, from the harmonization of quality standards to the enforceability of contracts across borders. This transnational cooperation amid a crisis of Western legitimacy raises critical questions. Who makes the rules? How do powerful Western actors construct governance institutions that are enforce­able? Under what conditions are the emerging non-Western corporate elite and their state allies, as well as more marginalized firms and states, able to recast the rules to better serve their interests? This book represents an effort to explore these questions through a study of negotiations over trans­national quality standards in the contemporary cotton trade. In this book, I chart a new course for understanding how the rules of the game are made and remade in the global arena. Many attempts to map change in governance institutions emphasize the high degree of uncertainty and hybridity that characterizes institutional transformations in the current era. A rigid world of interstate treaties has been replaced by fluid inter­actions within more amorphous and diverse "transnational communities" or "webs of influence" (Djelic and Quack 2010; Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). New forms of"experimentalist'' governance are emerging as actors try to respond flexibly to a shifting terrain (Sabel and Zeitlin 2010 ). It seems that the foundations of economic governance are "disaggregating" beneath our feet (see Slaughter 2004). These are not shock-like transformations in institutions but rather incremental changes that are nonetheless transform­ing the rules of the game. These accounts provide valuable descriptions of how institutional ar­rangements are changing. What they lack is a robust explanation of why 
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institutions change. We are instructed to expect incremental movements 
toward "something entirely new, unexpected, unanticipated and emer­
gent'' (Djelic and Quack 2003a:9). However, we are not given the tools 
to understand why such incremental yet transformational changes should 
be expected or why certain emergent outcomes might be more likely than 
others. The future trajectory of institutional change is indeed uncertain and 
the stakes are high. As diverse actors-from firms and government agen­
cies to lawyers, scientists, and agricultural producers-struggle over what 
rules will prevail, profits are made and lost, jobs move from one country 
to another, and economic superpowers are born or wither away. It is thus 
imperative that we garner the theoretical tools to make sense of this uncer­
tainty and chart the range of future possibilities. 
The crux of my argument is this: hegemonic rivalries shape strategies to 
change institutions. As coalitions of powerful firms and states create insti­
tutions to expand the scale and scope of the global economy, they unleash 
new competitive dynamics that both give rise to new rivals that seek to take 
control of these institutions and generate marginalized actors that seek to 
challenge their destructive effects. Periods of uncertainty over whose rules 
will prevail in the global economy are thus the result of the patterns of con­
flict generated by projects of market liberalization. Just as the hegemonic 
coalition led by the British state and firms faced challenges to its free trade 
imperialism in the early decades of the twentieth century, so too is the he­
gemonic coalition led by the US state and transnational firms facing chal­
lenges to its own free market project in the early decades of the twenty-first 
century. 
Actors' positions within these broader conflicts over the organization of 
the global capitalist system shape their preferences, bargaining power, and 
thus strategies in institutional struggles. This conflict-driven process of in­
stitutional change is inevitably incremental in nature. New rivals remain 
dependent on the existing arrangements that stimulated their own rise to 
power, yet seek to redirect these institutions to privilege their own interests 
over those of already dominant actors. This was the situation faced by the 
US state as it sought to take control of the institutions governing the cotton 
trade in the early 1900s and is now the predicament of the Chinese state as 
it faces US-dominated institutions. These rivals must first imitate existing 
institutional arrangements before they can overtake them. 
The institutions that result from these conflict-driven processes are also 
inevitably hybrid as dominant actors are compelled to reconstitute their 
own rules to protect their institutional privileges. Facing growing chal-
INTRODUCTION 7 lenges from both new rivals and marginalized actors, dominant actors do not simply cling to existing rules. Instead, dominant actors reconstruct the rules to at once appease their challengers and protect their institutional privileges. Just as Britain sought to retool its institutions governing the cot­ton trade to stave off challenges from both rivals and marginalized actors within the United States, the US state and transnational merchants recon­figured their existing arrangements in the contemporary era to appease ri­vals in China and marginalized actors in the global South. The new, hybrid institutions that emerge from these dynamic interactions reflect and instan­tiate the broader geoeconomic and geopolitical transitions among rivaling hegemonic coalitions. Forwarding this argument, I develop a theory of institutional change within the global capitalist system. In doing so, I intervene in the ongoing debates about globalization and institutional change in two ways. The in­stitutionalist literature has emerged as a prominent approach to studying institutional change in the global arena. Institutionalist scholars have at­tempted to map "transnational governance in the making," an approach that captures the complex dynamics among a wide diversity of actors op­erating within and across national and supranational governance arrange­ments (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006:2). These scholars offer com­
pelling accounts of how institutions change and how new institutions are forged through trial-and-error processes of experimentation and innovation within the constraints of existing institutions and shared cultural frames. I build on these accounts by grounding them in a theory of conflict. I see struggles over institutions and institutional change as emerging out of the concrete class relations and material and ideological circumstances charac­terizing the actually-existing global capitalist system. I demonstrate how ex­perimentation and innovation in rule-making processes must be embedded within an analysis of historically specific institutional and systemic power relations. In short, institutionalist accounts tell us how transnational rules are made. But it is only a theory of institutional change within the global capitalist system that can tell us why certain actors can redirect the rules of the game to serve their interests and why other actors accept or reject these rules. The lineages of this type of approach can be traced to scholars in the Regulation School, the neo-Polanyian tradition, and the world-systems ap­proach, among others (e.g., Aglietta 1979; Arrighi 1994; Block 1994, 2007; Block and Evans 2005; Streeck 2009; Wallerstein 1974). The second intervention addresses those scholars who do place emerging transnational governance institutions within the dynamics of capitalism. 
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This scholarship often emphasizes the rise of transnational firms that can 
largely set the rules of the game as a defining characteristic of global economic 
integration (e.g., Robinson 2003; Sklair 2001). In doing so, scholars tend to 
focus on a singular axis of struggle between a global elite -a transnational 
capitalist class and its state allies-and the marginalized actors and social 
movements who may challenge dominant firms and institutions. Yet these 
accounts give little attention to the growing geoeconomic and geopolitical 
uncertainty in the global economy. The rise of the so-called "emerging 
economies" in China and India is recasting the terrain of struggle in new 
and complex ways that cannot be mapped by focusing solely on powerful 
Western firms and their state allies or even on the struggle between global 
elites and social movements. Rather, as I will demonstrate, the struggle over 
transnational rules of the game is at once a struggle among global elites and 
social movements, among powerful Western firms and emerging rivals in 
countries like China and India, and among states in a competition to trans· 
form their roles and activities to influence transnational governance. It is by 
understanding the dynamic interplay across these different axes of struggle 
within the historical development of the global capitalist system that we can 
make sense of institutional change in periods of hegemonic rivalry. 
THE LIMITS OF INSTITUTIONALISM 
How do existing institutions change and how are new institutions and rules 
constructed in the transnational arena? This question has become a central 
problematic in institutionalist approaches to globalization. Indeed, recent 
scholarship has refocused the analysis on institutional change, rather than 
persistence and reproduction, and on the strategic role of actors in creating 
change. These scholars have identified key mechanisms that illuminate how 
change occurs. Yet, they are limited in their ability to explain why institu· 
tions change and why they change as they do. 
The limitations of institutionalist accounts of change are rooted in their 
treatment of power. Alford and Friedland (1985) suggest that power oper­
ates at three levels: the situational level, the institutional level, and the sys­
temic level.1 The exercise of power at the situational level represents con­
testation over the "plays of the game." That is, actors struggle over direct
power relations, or over their relative ability to command obedience from
other actors. At the institutional level, contestation focuses on the "rules
of the game."2 Actors vie to influence institutional design such that their 
interests become reflected in rules for how the institution will operate, set
INTRODUCTION 9 agendas, and make decisions. Finally, contestation at the systemic level means a struggle over the game itself. For example, the Cold War could be characterized as a struggle over the game, as the United States and the USSR competed over what game or system -capitalism or communism -should be played. Institutionalist scholars focusing on change lack a robust theory of conflict as they focus on situational and institutional power, largely to the exclusion of systemic power. A key contribution of change-oriented variants of institutionalism has been to move beyond a focus on institutional reproduction and persistence. Historical institutionalists have tended to see institutions as highly durable given that actors develop interests and strategies that serve to reinforce ex­isting arrangements (e.g., varieties of capitalism approach of Hall and Sos­kice 2001). This approach emphasizes the path-dependencies that limit the likelihood of changes that will fundamentally transform social relations. Significant change occurs only in the event of an external shock or seren­dipitous incident that can reroute institutions onto a new path dependent trajectory (e.g., Krasner 1984). Historical institutionalists thus emphasize the power of institutions to shape behavior and tend to underemphasize the ability of actors to shape institutions and to intentionally shape them to serve their interests (Chorev 2007; Crouch 200,:chapter 2; Streeck and Yamamura 2001; Thelen 2004).3 Put differently, scholars critique historical institutionalism for focusing on institutional power while giving little atten­tion to situational power. In contrast, scholars who have refocused on institutional change put situational power at the center of their analysis as a way to understand how institutions can change without an exogenous shock to punctuate its self-reinforcing equilibrium (Djelic and Quack 2003b, 2007; Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Sewell 1992; Streeck and Thelen 200,; Thelen 2009). From this view, sources of endogenous, incremental change can be found in the relation between institutions and the social activities they seek to govern. Specifically, these scholars see institutional change as emerging due to the gap between formal rules and the ability to enforce them, or, as Streeck and Thelen put it, the "gap between the ideal pattern of a rule and the real pat­
tern of life under it'' (200,:14, original emphasis). Formal rules are always incomplete and ambiguous, making implementation unpredictable. Rules can embody counterposing ideals, loopholes, or inconsistencies, which give actors-and particularly rule-takers-opportunities to resist implementa­tion, or to reinterpret the rules to better serve their interests (Clemens and Cook 1999; Djelic and Quack 2003b; Halliday and Carruthers 2009). As 
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actors creatively strategize around the contradictions within and between 
existing institutions, change is possible. Small, incremental changes can 
culminate in consequential change that does not just reproduce existing 
social relationships but instead transforms them (Streeck and Thelen 2005), 
In short, by refocusing attention on strategic action, these scholars demon­
strate that, while the rules of the game shape the plays of the game, at the 
same time, the plays of the game can influence the rules of the game. 
The problem is that institutionalists focusing on change give little at­
tention to the nature of the game itself, or the power relations defined by 
the system itself-in this case, the global capitalist system. This limits the 
explanatory power of their accounts. While these scholars recognize that 
resistance to existing rules can generate change, they are largely unable to 
explain why actors resist the rules to begin with. This is not to say that insti­
tutionalists do not account for conflict. To the contrary, many accounts see 
conflict as endemic to institutions. But, by ignoring systemic power, they 
lack a theory of what the conflict is about. 4 They assume actors' resistance 
to formal rules rather than providing a theory of conflict that would explain 
actors' resistance, as well as their strategies to direct institutional change. 
Some scholars focused on institutional change do attempt to theorize 
conflict. However, their theories largely take the form of typologies that 
leave the systemic roots of power and conflict unspecified. For example, 
Halliday and Carruthers (2009) study the transnational harmonization of 
bankruptcy laws. These prominent sociologists of law see "global" and "lo­
cal" actors clashing over the harmonization of governance arrangements.S 
They argue that the conflict is shaped by two dimensions of power: the bal­
ance of power between the national and global; and the cultural and social 
"distance" between global and local actors. The "distance" between actors, 
they suggest, indicates ''how far apart the two sides of the interaction are at 
the outset'' (2009:22). The greater the distance in terms of institutional pref· 
erences, the greater the likelihood of conflict. The balance of power ''helps 
to determine which side is more likely to be moving toward the other" in 
the process of negotiating (2009:22-23). 
But, one might ask, what is the source of the "distance" between "global" 
and "local" actors' institutional preferences and how might that shape the 
circumstances under which one side would move toward the other? Is this 
"distance" simply due to the lack of interaction, thus requiring time for
actors to come to common understandings? Or is it the kind of social and
cultural distance that emerges from a specific history of unequal relations
that breeds distance in institutional preferences as well as resistance and
INTRODUCTION 11 mistrust (e.g., Roberts and Parks 2007)? Halliday and Carruthers offer us a typology of actors and their potential orientations but, as Burawoy might put it, provide no ''basis or source for particular patterns of conflict'' (Bura­woy 1979:9). The lack of attention to systemic power further limits the ability of insti­tutionalists to explain why changing institutions ultimately take the form that they do. These scholars emphasize the potential for highly novel institu­tional arrangements to emerge in the global arena. In doing so, they critique cultural institutionalists, such as world society scholars, who see organiza­tions worldwide converging onto similar institutional forms through a pro­cess of mimetic isomorphism (e.g., Boll and Thomas 1999; Drori et al. 2003; Meyer et al. 1997). For institutionalists focused on change, actors do not simply adopt common institutional designs to gain legitimacy on the global stage, nor are institutions simply becoming more similar. Instead, institu­tions can take diverse and innovative forms through the dynamic interplay between the rules of the game and the plays of the game. Strategic actors, such as institutional entrepreneurs (DiMaggio 1988) or brico/eurs (Campbell 2004), manipulate meanings and symbols, organize key constituencies, and create "new solutions out of an admixture of preexisting elements" as they actively cultivate the legitimacy of their preferred rules (Halliday and Car­ruthers 2009:28; Campbell 2004; Djelic and Quack 2003b). The problem with this account is that the possible forms that new insti­tutions might take seem endless. Innovation is limited by actors' abilities to imagine new combinations of existing institutional fragments. By neglect­ing systemic power, institutionalists do not explain how the game itself puts 
limits on what kind of institutional change is possible. Moreover, they over­look important factors that shape why some actors are better institutional entrepreneurs than others or why some are particularly adept brico/eurs.Part of the problem is that institutionalist approaches tend to theorize history rather than historicize theory in their approach to institutional change. 6 Theorizing history is the common approach to modern social sci­ence. From this view, the problem to be explained is cast in general terms: how do institutions change? The answers are transhistorical: institutions change through the interplay of cultural frames, institutional path depen­dencies, and strategic action. In short, institutionalists provide a theory of the general properties of institutions that is considered applicable across space and time. In accounts at this level of abstraction, the underlying causes of institutional change remain a mystery. Wolfgang Streeck argues that what institutional analyses "failed (and in fact never intended) to do 
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was to account for the historical emergence and the pervasiveness of the 
sort of change that it had been developed to capture-its location in time 
and space as well as its direction and driving forces" (2011:139). Streeck 
(2009, 2010, 2011) has recently sought to embed his earlier institutionalist 
analyses (e.g., Streeck and Thelen 200,) within a theory of capitalism. 
In short, institutionalist approaches to transnational governance have 
generated a rich conceptual vocabulary for understanding institutional 
change and institution-building. But they are divorced from the specificities 
of the socioeconomic orders that construct and are constructed by these in­
stitutions. That is, institutions are abstracted from the global capitalist sys­
tem. If our goal is to understand why institutional change occurs and why 
new institutional arrangements take the form that they do, "these are ques­
tions a framework that takes capitalism for granted cannot even pose, let 
alone answer" (Burawoy 1979:12). What is needed is a historicized theory 
of institutional change as it is constituted by and constitutive of a socially 
and spatially specific economic system. 
EMBEDDING INSTITUTIONS IN THE 
GLOBAL CAPITALIST SYSTEM 
A theory of institutional change in the global capitalist system focuses on un­
derstanding why the rules of the game change and what form those changes 
take. Institutional power cannot be understood in isolation from situational 
and systemic power. Rather, these levels of power must be understood as 
necessarily intertwined and in dynamic interplay. Struggles over the rules 
of the game will be influenced both by the plays of the game and the game 
itself. The rules of the game can change as actors challenge or circumvent 
them through their strategies in the plays of the game. Moreover, the nature 
of the game itself-in this case, global capitalism-and broader struggles 
over how it should be organized shape the range of possible institutional 
rules and achievable goals (Wright 1994:93). In short, struggles over the 
rules of the game must be understood as embedded within material and 
discursive contestation at all three levels. 
This requires theorizing the specificities of institutions within the global 
capitalist system. Institutions emerge and change in relation to the particu­
lar dynamics of global capitalist development-that is, institutions and the 
economy are mutually constituting spheres of activity, neither of which can 
function without the other (Block 1994; Block and Evans 200,). This per­
spective runs counter to institutionalist scholarship (Streeck 2009) but also
to orthodox economics and neo-Marxist accounts that ignore the role of in-
INTRODUCTION 13 stitutions in the construction of capitalism. Rather than seeing the capital­ist economy as expanding according to an internal and independent logic, capitalism must be understood as a "constructed system" (Block 2002:223). The global economy is made and remade through political struggle over the institutions that shape capitalist relations and the distribution of the ben­efits and costs of capital accumulation. From this perspective, we can un­derstand capitalism as an expansionary system but also emphasize that, as a product of political struggle, the potential trajectories of capitalist develop­ment are diverse. As such, understanding institutional change is critical as it is tantamount to understanding the development of capitalism. This approach has the potential to ground the abstract conceptualiza­tions of institutional change offered by recent variants of institutionalism. Institutions must be understood not in abstract form but as constructed to facilitate certain configurations of capitalism. As Karl Polanyi (1957 [1944]) suggests, the historical trajectory of capitalism as an institutionalized social order can be understood as unfolding through successive political projects in which powerful firms and states attempt to extend capitalist market re­lations in ways that serve their perceived interests in market liberalism. On a global stage, hegemonic coalitions of states and firms have histori­cally pursued liberal market projects to expand capitalist markets across space and to capture the benefits of this expanded trade (see Arrighi 1994; Silver and Arrighi 2003). Just as the hegemonic coalition led by the British state and firms sought to secure their geoeconomic dominance over poten­tial rivals in the United States and Europe, the contemporary neoliberal co­alition led by the US state and transnational firms has sought to capture the benefits of expanded global trade for themselves over competitors in China. In order to pursue these projects, firms construct-and compel states to construct-a constellation of governance institutions that facilitate and en­force privatization, commoditization, and market liberalization on an ever more extensive scale. Rules that foster market expansion, such as quality standards, can be understood as embedded within such broader projects of market liberalism. This conceptualization of institutions runs counter to historical institu­tionalist accounts that see institutional design as a product of historical con­tingency and serendipitous events (see Mahoney 2000). While institutions are historically specific and contingent, they are also intentionally planned. This does not mean that a single institutional entrepreneur or small group of actors can just willfully construct an institution in order to secure their preferences. Institutions are always the product of political struggle and compromise. Moreover, intentionally constructing an institution does not 
14 CHAPTER ONE mean that the rule-makers must fully understand the problems to be solved at the outset (or at any time during the rule-making process), nor that they accurately identify the solution that would best achieve their preferences. Institutionalists are correct in suggesting that rule-makers construct institu­tions through processes of experimentation. However, seeing institutions as designed within the global capitalist system means that actors' perceived interests in institutional design, and their ability to pursue these interests successfully, are structured by their position within the competitive dynam­ics of capitalism. In short, projects of market expansion are often lopsided, scattered, and pieced together in a trial-and-error way as actors seek to solve the problems they face given their position within historically and spatially specific processes of capital accumulation. Liberal market projects are both material and discursive in nature. Ac­tors construct discursive legitimations in particular contexts and with the aini to inform, steer, and legitimate particular projects of liberal market development. Drawing on the work of Edward Said (1978), Ngai-Ling Sum (2000) demonstrates how particular historical configurations of capitalism are constructed through processes of"othering," or the discursive construc­tion of certain people, places, practices, and governance arrangements as fair, just, or superior, while constructing the rest as "others," that is, people and practices that are unfair, inferior, or even dangerous. For example, US discourses promoting neoliberal trade policies in the 1970s and 1980s "oth­ered" Japan's more protectionist economic and political institutions as "un­fair'' trade practices. This view of the role of ideas departs significantly from much of the lit­erature on institutional change. Like their conceptualization of institutions more generally, cultural and change-oriented institutionalists see the role of discourse in institution-building in highly abstract terms. They see ''world cultural scripts" or "legitimation mandates," such as science, representa­tion, or procedural fairness, as shaping actors' ability to construct institu­tions as legitimate (Black 2008; Halliday and Carruthers 2009; Meyer et al. 1997; Quack 2010). However, these discursive constructs seem to appear from nowhere (Schwartzman 2006) and/or are presented as transhistori­cal principles of legitimacy that can be applied at any time and place. Dis­courses must be understood as constituted in particular places and periods in relation to the historical development of the global capitalist system. Con­structed in relation to concrete patterns of social struggle, these discourses shape how actors come to understand the problems posed by the existing economic organization and the rules that support it. 
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NEW PATTERNS OF CONFLICT WITHIN 
PROJECTS OF MARKET EXPANSION The trajectory of capitalist development is never wholly constructed by these political projects of market liberalism and the material relationships and discursive constructs that define them. When powerful actors construct governance institutions to support a project of market expansion, these in­stitutions can mold the real pattern of economic life to serve their aims to a significant degree. But they also generate new dynamics that can make the enforcement of formal rules difficult Because capitalism is a relational and thus conflictual system, institutions that facilitate it create particular patterns of social conflict. Understanding institutional change thus requires grasping the types of social conflict that market-facilitating institutions gen­erate, particularly on a global scale. These new patterns of conflict reshape actors' preferences, bargaining power, and strategies to challenge and re­construct existing institutions. Liberal market institutions generate new axes of conflict that destabilize the institutions themselves. While taking historically and spatially specific forms, there are two key axes of conflict that liberal market institutions generate: conflicts emerging from the creative and the destructive dynam­ics of liberal market expansion. As both Karl Marx (1976 [1867]) and Joseph Schum.peter (1976 [1942]) have emphasized, the extension of market disci­pline has both creative effects, which stimulate technological and organi­zational change and provide new opportunities for some actors to improve their competitive position, and destructive effects, which undermine com­petitive positions and livelihood strategies. As actors' competitive positions and relative bargaining power shift, these creative and destructive dynamics generate distinct types of conflict. The creative dynamics of liberal market institutions generate conflict by giving rise to new rivals capable of challenging the institutional privileges of dominant actors. Market-facilitating institutions intensify interfirm compe­tition. In doing so, they set off a creative process that stimulates technologi­cal and organizational innovation. Firms seek to create new technologies and products, design new strategies to minimize costs and control workers, and attain new economies of scale and speed to ensure their survival. In David Harvey's words, ''The struggle to maintain profitability sends capi­talists racing off to explore all kinds of other possibilities" (1995:106). In this competitive process, it is not necessarily already-dominant firms who win out. To the contrary, the unintended outcome of the creative moment 
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of liberal market projects is often the emergence of challengers who rival 
the economic power of previously dominant firms as competition drives 
the consolidation of capital. In short, liberal market projects generate new 
rivals that enjoy increasing bargaining power vis-a-vis dominant actors. 
These new rival firms can use their enhanced bargaining power to circwn­
vent or challenge existing rules. 
The second axis of conflict emerges out of the destructive dynamics of 
liberal market institutions. Political projects to extend market relations 
across the globe seek to secure the rights of capital over labor and other 
marginalized actors. Firms use political power to protect rights to private 
property at the expense of the rights of workers and other marginalized 
groups. As Gill puts it, the central goal of market liberalization is to "subject 
the majority of the population to the power of market forces whilst preserv· 
ing social protection for the strong'' (1994:407). By privileging the pursuit 
of profit over societal well-being and sustainability, liberal market institu· 
tions threaten established ways of making a living. As Karl Polanyi (1957 
[1944)) has argued, the destructive dynamics of deepening market relations 
generate social conflict, which can make the enforcement of liberal market 
institutions difficult. That is, these actors marginalized by liberal market 
projects are compelled to defend "established and widely accepted social 
compacts on the right to livelihood-in other words, [they are] in part fu­
eled by a sense of 'injustice'" (Silver 2003:18).
This argument follows Polanyi's claim that liberal market projects gen· 
erate social conflict and spur countermovements for societal protection. 
However, I argue that distinct types of "push-backs" against liberal market 
projects often derive from different axes of conflict and thus are more di· 
verse than Polanyi suggests and can take competitive rather than protective 
forms. In essence, a more complex terrain of struggle must be mapped in 
order to understand the trajectory of institutional change. To do this, I draw 
on both nee-Marxist and especially world-systems analyses of systemic 
chaos during periods of hegemonic rivalries (e.g., Arrighi 1994; Arrighi and 
Silver 1999; Wallerstein 1974). 
STRATEGIES FOR CONTESTING 
LIBERAL MARKET INSTITUTIONS 
By identifying the underlying causes of conflict, we can understand not only 
why actors contest institutions but also the types of strategies they pursue. 
Given their particular positions within these shifting dynamics, different 
actors develop distinct institutional strategies, or efforts to reconstruct in· 
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TABLE 1.1. Actors' Institutional Positions and Strategies in Relation to Dominant Actors' 
Liberal Economic Projects. 
Actors Position within Institutional Position Institutional Strategy 
Liberal Market 
Projects 
Dominant Established Privileged by the Preservation Strategy to 
institutions to existing institutions reconstruct institutions 
facilitate their in ways that preserve 
interests in market existing institutional 
liberalism privileges 
Rival Improved bargaining Disadvantaged by Redirection Strategy to 
position due to existing institutions reconstruct institutions 
creative dynamics of but capable of to privilege their 
market liberalism competing for preferences rather 
institutional privileges than those of currently 
privileged actors 
Marginalized Deteriorated Disadvantaged by Protection Strategy to 
bargaining position existing institutions reconstruct institutions 
due to destructive but not capable to minimize their 
dynamics of market of competing for disadvantages 
liberalism institutional privileges 
stitutions to achieve their preferences. In particular, I identify three types 
of institutional strategies that are stimulated by these axes of conflict This 
argument is depicted in Table 1.1. Emerging Rivals and Redirection Strategies 
The bargaining power of emerging rivals increases through the creative dy­
namics of liberal market projects. From this enhanced position, new rivals 
pursue redirection strategies that aim to transform institutions to privilege 
their interests over those of dominant actors. But why would these emerg­
ing rivals want to change the rules of the game if they rose to power through 
the use of these rules? The answer to this question lies in the nature of 
market-facilitating institutions themselves. That is, firms generally do not 
attempt to construct institutions that intensify market discipline in general 
but rather develop institutions that serve their particular interests. Firms 
pursuing a project of market liberalism prefer institutional designs that cre­
ate advantages not just for capitalists over workers but for certain capital­
ists over others and certain places over others. Rules that facilitate market
liberalism thus represent what Santos (1995') terms globalized localisms, or
18 CHAPTER ONE rules developed in a particular context to serve specific interests that are then imposed on others. Because of this, emerging rivals face the problem of institutional incon­gruities, or a mismatch between the social, cultural, material, and techno­logical conditions assumed by the existing institutional arrangements and the actual conditions in which rivals are embedded. Institutions are con­structed in a particular place and time and carry with them a host of social, cultural, material, and technological conditions that cannot necessarily be replicated with ease. Thus, as the power of rival firms and states grows, we are more likely to see effective challenges to the enforcement of dominant rules. In their study of private, transnational arbitration, Yves Dezalay and Bry­ant Garth (1995, 1996) elucidate this point. They demonstrate how Western firms, lawyers, and arbitrators sought to build a system of private business dispute settlement as part of the legal framework to facilitate market ex­pansion on a global stage. However, even though all the players involved had a common interest in creating a transnational legal field that would be autonomous from state courts, firms and arbitrators struggled over which firms and which places would be privileged by these governance institu­tions. By successfully prevailing over the continental European arbitral tra­dition, Anglo-American lawyers, arbitrators, and the firms they represented won the ability to "play by their own terms" (Dezalay and Garth 1995:52). This goes against the grain of many accounts that focus on the rise of transnational firms and private authority as the defining characteristic of globalization. In this view, a transnational capitalist class is characterized as triumphing over states and workers in its unified goal to push a lib­eral market agenda across the globe (Robinson 2003; Sklair 2001). How­ever, this overwhelming focus on the power of transnational firms neglects the contestation among these firms and their implications for governance institutions. As Schrank suggests, we must consider "the possibility of a cosmopolitan-but-combative capitalist class" (2005:94; see also Kaup forth­coming; McMichael 2001). Firms do not simply create institutions to privi­lege the interests of capital over labor nor do they create a level playing field for competing firms. Rather they create institutions that serve their specific-and geographical-interests over those of competing firms. Even quite powerful firms and/or states, however, do not easily prevail over the institutionalized power of already-dominant firms and states. In their redirection strategies, rivals face the problem of institutional depen­dence. That is, rivals are dependent as they remain reliant on the existing 
INTRODUCTION 19 arrangements even as they attempt to redirect them. It was the institutions established by the dominant actors that created opportunities for rivals to emerge. Rivals are thus unlikely to simply replace these institutions. In­stead, they incrementally reconstitute these institutions to better privilege their preferences. Nowhere is this clearer than in the debate over voting power in the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Emerging ri­vals like China and India do not seek to dismantle these institutions of US hegemony. They seek to gain greater influence within them and redirect them in their favor. From this view, conflict-driven processes of institu­tional change are inevitably incremental as rivals must retool and revise the existing rules. In his provocative book, Playing Our Game, MIT political scientist Ed­ward Steinfeld argues that the ability of Chinese firms and the Chinese state to change the rules of the game to better serve their interests is complicated by the fact that their economic and political power has grown within "a game created and defined by the world's advanced industrial economies, most notably the United States" (2010:24). China has willingly, or through the stipulations of outside organizations like the WTO, engaged in what Steinfeld calls institutional outsourcing. That is, in order to facilitate its spectacular economic growth, the Chinese state and Chinese firms have im­ported a range of institutions from a currency management system to, as we will see, a system of cotton quality classification. Just replicating these in­stitutions domestically is a daunting task. It requires that certain practices, technologies, expertise, people, tools, and standards must be transferred from one context to another. 7 Adopting a new currency management sys­tem, for example, requires not only new technologies but also new forms of formal and tacit knowledge and even new types of bureaucrats. The ability of the Chinese state or Chinese firms to not only replicate but also redirect such institutions to serve their interests is highly uncertain. From this view, historical institutionalists' attention to path dependen­cies of existing institutions is critical, so long as we contextualize them within particular trajectories of institutionalized global capitalist develop­ment. Actors construct governance institutions to solve the problems they face given their historically and spatially specific position within processes of accumulation. These institutions then carry with them complex and his­torically specific constellations of knowledge/expertise, technology, materi­ality, discursive legitimations, social roles, and relationships that cannot be cast aside, transplanted elsewhere, or redirected to serve different interests in a simple and straightforward way. 
20 CHAPTER ONE Marginalized Actors and Protection Strategi,es 
While emerging rivals may pose the greatest threat to the institutional privi­
leges enjoyed by dominant actors, marginalized actors too advance chal­
lenges that can be effective. Marginalized actors' bargaining power is un­
dermined by the destructive dynamics of liberal market projects. Lacking 
the bargaining power to compete for institutional privileges, these actors 
pursue protection strategi.es, which seek to reconstruct institutions to mini­
mize the disadvantages marginalized actors face. 
Rachel Schurman and William Munro (2010) demonstrate these dynam­
ics in their study of struggles between activists and agribusiness firms over 
the governance of biotechnology. They reveal how agribusiness firms, and 
particularly the biotech giant Monsanto, sought to piece together a global 
legal framework to privatize and commodify life forms through the pro­
tection of intellectual property rights for genetically modified (GM) seeds. 
Activists from the United States to Zambia, however, saw these institutions 
as having destructive effects, linking them to a range of issues from the loss 
of genetic diversity to the intensification of rural poverty and inequality by 
forcing small farmers to purchase rather than save and replant their seeds. 
These were not simply struggles over material well-being but also discur­
sive struggles to define what is fair and just Biotech proponents saw GM 
seeds as "good technologies" that were profitable and had the potential to 
feed the world's growing population. Opponents, in contrast, saw Mon­
santo's aggressive attempts to sell their seeds around the world as evidence 
of "greed and economic rapaciousness" (2010:189). As such, these activists 
launched what we might call protection strategies to contest these gover­
nance arrangements that privileged a small group of corporate elite over the 
environment, food security, and farmers around the world. 
In this way, we can see how more marginalized players, particularly as 
they organize together, can be "strategic actors" or "institutional entrepre­
neurs" who search out loopholes and weak points in existing institutions in 
order to challenge them, much as institutionalists would suggest However, 
by understanding these challenges as resistance to the destructive effects of 
market liberalism, we are able to understand why this contestation occurs, 
Marginalized actors contest governance institutions that they perceive as 
threatening their established livelihoods and their ideas about what is fair
and just. 
Marginalized actors will not necessarily be successful in their attempts to 
challenge liberal market institutions. Contrary to institutionalist accounts 
INTRODUCTION 21 that have difficulty specifying why some actors are more effective than oth­ers, situating them within processes of capital accumulation helps us to understand the relative abilities of different players to effectively operate as institutional entrepreneurs. Protection strategies are, by nature, waged by actors who have relatively little power compared with dominant firms and states and who see their rights and resources undermined by liberal market projects. Given the limited bargaining power of marginalized actors, pro­tection strategies are only rarely the decisive factor in struggles over institu­tions. However, as social movement scholars have demonstrated, the kinds of claims that such movements make and the discursive frames that they construct can influence the strategies of more powerful firms and states and shape the form that the resulting governance institutions will take (see Smith and Wiest 2012). Despite the influence that protection strategies can wield in struggles over governance institutions, we cannot assume that their strategies will take progressive forms. Recent analysts have argued that both the global justice movement and the religious Right in the United States can be seen as reactions to the destructive effects of liberal market projects (see Evans 2008; Block 2007, respectively; see also Harvey 200,). This is because both of these protection strategies are shaped by actors' positions not only within social and spatial patterns of accumulation pursued by a given liberal mar­ket project, but also within historically and contextually specific social and cultural dynamics. Indeed, marketization and commoditization projects generate historically and spatially specific protection strategies that can take a wide diversity of forms (see also Brenner et al. 2010; Mansfield 2004). Dominant Actors and Preservation Strategi.es It is not only emerging rivals and marginalized actors who seek to reconsti­tute the existing institutional structure. Dominant actors, too, play a critical role in spurring institutional change. This at first seems counterintuitive. Dominant actors create institutions like quality standards to facilitate trade and reflect their preferences over those of workers, other marginalized ac­tors, and rival firms and states. These actors are thus privileged by the ex­isting institutional structure and the organization of the global economy it engenders and would be reticent to change it. However, the challenges from both rival and marginalized actors desta­bilize the existing institutional structure and make the enforcement of rulesdifficult. In this context, even dominant actors are compelled to reconfigure
22 CHAPTER ONE existing arrangements in an effort to protect their institutional privileges. Dominant actors develop preservation strategies that aim to reconstruct in­stitutions in ways that both appease challengers and protect their institu­tional privileges (cf. Gramsci 1971). These are not strategies to simply deflect challenges and preserve institutions in their existing form. Rather, given the growing bargaining power of rivals and the potential for marginalized actors to disrupt accumulation patterns, dominant actors are compelled to actively reconfigure the institutional structure in an effort to quell these challenges and maintain what institutional privileges they can. These conflict-driven processes result in institutions that are inevitably hybrid. This is not because challengers are guaranteed success in their ef­forts to reconstruct the existing rules but rather because dominant actors' preservation strategies attempt to pacify the challengers by offering some palatable changes. For example, scholars point to the efforts of the World Bank and the IMF to roll out a kinder, gentler neoliberalism in the face of growing popular movements around the globe that challenge their role in upholding the US-led neoliberal project (e.g., Jessop 2002; Barra and Delio Buono 2009). The conflicts generated by liberal market projects thus compel dominant actors to take an active role in stimulating institutional change. States and Geopolitical Competition The axes of conflict I identify represent conflictual relationships amongpri· vate actors operating in the market. Indeed, these institutional positions (dominant, rival, and marginalized actors) and institutional strategies (pres· ervation, redirection, protection) can be occupied and pursued by private actors. At the same time, however, it is common for private actors to im· plore states to support their strategy and to pursue it on their behalf. Capi· talist firms can -indeed, must-rely on states to create and enforce much of the institutional infrastructure necessary for the functioning of global markets (Block 2007; Chorev 2007; Fligstein and Merand 2002). Because of this, firms and other actors in society compete to influence not only state policies but also state roles in shaping and/or regulating other governance bodies, such as private regulatory agencies or supranational institutions. Actors marginalized by liberal market projects also turn to the state as a site to contest institutions that destabilize their livelihood strategies. Thus, while projects of market expansion necessarily privilege certain actors over others, states often face domestic contestation both over whether market 
INTRODUCTION 23 expansion is desirable and over whose preferences institutions supporting market expansion will privilege. From this view, global economic integration does not reduce the role of states in the economy. Instead, it creates new demands on states, or particu­lar branches of states. States are compelled to transform their roles, activi­ties, and even institutional forms in order to participate in or contest par­ticular projects of market expansion in ways that protect its citizens and/or enhance the competitiveness of its domestic firms. As such, states, or coali­tions of states and private actors, can also occupy institutional positions as dominant, rival, or marginalized actors. Moreover, coalitions of states and firms can pursue preservation, redirection, or protection strategies, or strat­egies that attempt to balance several of these elements. States, however, play a dual role, in that they not only shape the in­stitutional terrain on which firms compete and more marginalized actors secure a livelihood, but also may emerge as competitors in their own right as they compete with other states to capture mobile capital and/or facili­tate the competitiveness of domestic over foreign firms. Many accounts of transnational governance institutions tend to underplay the competitive dy­namics among states. Anne-Marie Slaughter (2004), for example, provides what is in many ways a paradigmatic study of states' efforts to transform their roles in an effort to participate in global economic governance. She argues that government officials disaggregate state sovereignty by building transnational networks with their counterparts around the globe to address common concerns such as the harmonization of regulations and cross­border enforcement. While acknowledging that government officials from different countries may have conflicting interests in governance networks, Slaughter insists that they can and do work together effectively by agree­ing to "constitutional norms" that ensure "an inclusive, tolerant, respectful, and decentralized world order'' (2004:27,29). However, by underplaying the competitive dynamics among states, her account leaves us with unan­swered questions. For instance, why would branches of "disaggregating states" choose this high-road strategy rather than pursue dominance within new governance institutions? Why would weaker states choose to partici­pate if a "high-road" approach is not assured? In short, Slaughter's account overlooks how geopolitical competition shapes the operation and form of networked governance institutions. This type of approach is short-sighted because emerging rivals-both firms and states -are not only interested in changing existing rules to serve their interests. They also seek the power that comes from controlling the 
24 CHAPTER ONE rules into the future (cf. Strange 1989). Over time, firms' and states' inter­ests in what rules prevail can change in relation to their own shifting com­petitiveness and due to changes in broader historical circumstances beyond their control. Emerging rivals thus may seek the agenda-setting power that comes from occupying key coordinating roles within institutions. We will see that the Chinese state sought to supplant US control over quality stan­dards. It recognized that the US state gained power from creating the physi­cal representations of quality standards that all others must use. As Drezner insists, we need to consider "the competition by the economic superpowers to win the standard-setting game" (2005:842). State preferences, however, may or may not align neatly with the prefer­ences of any particular social group in its territory. While coalitions of states and domestic elites are common, these coalitions are neither automatic nor unproblematic. They can be made difficult both by competing elite class fractions within a state with different interests in what institutional strategy to pursue and by the protection strategies of marginalized actors. Thus, critical to a successful preservation, redirection, or protection strategy is coalition building. Actors must develop tactics to reconstruct the existing institutional arrangements to advance and gain broader support for/acqui­escence to their project. Particularly with the rise of transnational firms who are increasingly un­moored from particular state spaces, building a coalition that can success­fully restabilize the rules of the game is far from straightforward. Indeed, we will see that transnational cotton merchants, historically aligned with the US state, faced a conundrum given the hegemonic rivalries between the United States and China. While the US state's support for their agenda of private transnational governance could be secured, transnational mer­chants were reticent to tie themselves to a sinking ship. In this context, transnational merchants attempted to position their private governance as geographically neutral and thus compatible with either Chinese- or US-led hegemony in the future. 
Institutional Change and Hegemonic Rivalries In sum, I argue that conflict over institutions like quality standards must be understood as constituted by and constitutive of broader struggles over the organization of the global capitalist system. Both challengers and dominant actors attempt to use strategies institutionalists identify in their efforts to transform institutions. Actors draw on, reconstitute, and mix historically 
INTRODUCTION 25 specific institutional fragments in the struggle to create and legitimate new rules in their interests. They engage in discursive hrico/age as they seek to shape ideas about who can legitimately set rules (e.g., states vs. firms); what kind of rules can be set (e.g., those that facilitate or hamper trade); and how they can be set (e.g., on the basis of scientific findings, or through demo­cratic procedures). In short, the dynamic interplay between institutions and strategic action that institutionalist scholars emphasize remains critical in this account. However, it is only by understanding the underlying conflict that we can understand why institutional change inevitably involves this dynamic interplay and results in hybrid institutions. Actors' preferences and relative bargaining power in a particular institu­tional struggle are shaped by their positions within a broader conflict gener­ated by the efforts of dominant firms and states (or hegemonic coalitions) to establish institutions that extend market discipline on a greater scale and in a geographical configuration that benefits them. In response, other firms and states (emerging rivals for hegemonic power and weaker actors) at­tempt to challenge and redirect these institutions to reconstruct the global capitalist system in their favor. By identifying the underlying causes of con­flict and the strategies actors pursue, my approach allows a careful analy­sis of the (possible) transition from one hegemonic coalition to another as struggles across a multitude of sectors ultimately instantiate this broader geoeconomic and geopolitical transition. 
WHY COTTON? The struggle over who makes the rules for the global economy is being fought on a myriad of battlegrounds across a wide range of sectors. Yet, cot­ton is in many ways an ideal lens through which to explore the dynamics of institutional change. In the contemporary era, conflict in the cotton trade cuts across critical fault lines in the global economy. Western transnational firms and states face challenges to their position as rule-makers not only from some of the weakest actors in the global economy, such as states and cotton producers in West Africa and their social movement allies, but also from some of the emerging giants, most importantly, China. But cotton has long been a commodity at the center of historical trans­formations in global capitalism. Cotton was one of the most important commodities linking the industrial revolution in Britain with slavery in the United States and the social, economic, and political devastation that the slave trade wrought on communities in West Africa. In an ironic twist, we 
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see these same nations linked by cotton again, yet this time in a different 
constellation of social relationships. West African producers now compete 
with those in the United States on the global market They do not, however, 
compete as equals. The farms of US producers are much larger (averaging 
around 1,000 acres) with highly mechanized operations. Their counterparts 
in West African countries work small plots of land (2-7 acres), which they 
plant, weed, and harvest by hand. While US producers are known for pro­
viding reliable supply in great volumes, it is widely agreed that West African 
producers not only grow cotton at a lower cost ($1.32/kg vs. $1.42/kg of 
lint) (Chaudhry 2008)8, but also produce cotton of some of the highest qual­
ity (Fok 2005). Although cotton exports are a rather insignificant slice of US 
trade, West African states accrue between 30 percent and 40 percent of their 
foreign exchange earnings from cotton exports (Baffes 2004). 
With privatization and the liberalization of markets in the 1990s and 
2000s, these two sets of cotton producers were drawn into more direct com­
petition and were increasingly linked to the same powerful middlemen. A 
handful of transnational merchants were coming to dominate the trade in 
not just cotton but a diverse portfolio of agricultural commodities. As these 
merchants competed to construct global sourcing networks and to manage 
the risks of commodity trade on the futures market, they claimed control 
over the critical link between geographically dispersed cotton producers 
and geographically dispersed and relatively small-scale textile manufactur· 
ers as textile and apparel production shifted from Western Europe to Asia. 
This position as key middlemen gave them significant power to direct the 
benefits of trade in their favor. 
The growing dominance of transnational firms vis-a-vis states, workers, 
and agricultural producers in the global economy has itself been deemed a 
critical shift in historical social relations. But in the early 2000s, the cotton 
trade became a key battleground for another potential shift: would the bal­
ance of power in the global economy shift increasingly to Asia, and particu­
larly to China? The phase-out of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) from 
1995 to 2005 liberalized trade in apparel and, paired with the accession of 
China to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, shifted the geogra­
phy of apparel and textile production. China burst on the scene as the larg­
est producer of textiles and apparel-and the largest importer of cotton-in 
the world. For China, cotton was a critical commodity that linked the fate of 
its agricultural producers with the competitiveness of its textile and apparel 
firms, the foreign exchange that they earned, and the millions of workers 
that they employed. Approximately 20 million people are directly involved 
INTRODUCTION 27 in the textile sector in China, and apparel and textiles accounted for 15 per­cent of China's total export value in 2005 (Alpermann 2010; FAS 2006). More than a hundred million farmers and farmworkers are involved in the production of cotton in China (Alpermann 2010). As these policy shifts augmented the economic power of China, they also gave new teeth to the crisis of Western legitimacy in the cotton trade. These policy shifts consolidated the power of three key actors: the Chinese state, the US state, and transnational cotton merchants. As of 2012, none of these actors has been capable of setting new rules of the game. Rather, the first decade of the twenty-first century was a period in which the Chinese state, the US state, and transnational merchants were competing over who could claim authority in the global cotton trade. That is, they competed over who could translate their economic power into legitimate and enforceable insti­tutional rules. The contemporary cotton trade lets us explore two stories that are critical to understanding both the crisis of Western legitimacy and emerging forms of transnational cooperation for economic governance. First is the story of weaker actors-in this case, cotton producers, small merchants/ginners, and states in West African countries (and other cotton-producing countries around the globe)-who are challenging the Western liberal market project that again subordinates them, albeit in new ways, in the global economy. The second story is of increasingly powerful actors, such as the Chinese state and Chinese textile manufacturers, who aspire to set their own rules for global trade. Perhaps most interesting is how the two stories intertwine. Together, these stories allow us to explore how the growing power of trans­national corporations, and their allies in Western states, is upset by shift­ing geopolitical dynamics. And they allow us to consider what this means for the construction of new transnational governance institutions and the ability of weaker actors to have their voices heard in these negotiations. In essence, these stories reveal the diverse axes of conflict and institutional strategies-redirection, protection, and preservation-that are generated by liberal market projects, and the hybrid institutions that result. 
WHY Q.UALITY STANDARDS? It is this varied group of firms and states in cotton-producing and -importingcountries, as well as an amalgam of scientists, arbitrators, and trade asso­ciation representatives, who negotiate economic governance in the cotton trade. And it is within these broader shifts in the power dynamics among 
28 CHAPTER ONE them that I explore negotiations over a key economic governance institu­tion: quality standards, and the mechanisms to settle disputes over quality. Admittedly, at first glance, quality standards seem to be a terribly mundane, technical issue that should hardly demand our attention. The reality, how­ever, is quite the opposite (see Busch 2000). Economic sociologist Jens Beckert (2009) sees quality standards as solv­ing the problem of valuation -a key coordination problem that must be solved to allow the creation of markets and their continued operation. Trade requires actors to come to an agreement over how the quality of a commodity will be evaluated and thus what price it will command. As such, Beckert considers understanding quality standards as one of the "founding problems for the sociology of markets" (2009:247). How an agreement on quality is reached is far from a straightforward, technical problem to be solved. Quality standards do not evaluate the "intrinsic qualities" of a good or service; rather they make some qualities visible while obscuring others (Daviron and Vagneron 20n; Thevenot 2009). Quality standards thus serve as rules of exchange that "define who can transact with whom and the conditions under which transactions are carried out'' (Fligstein 1996:659), As different actors have distinct interests in what standards should be, they have critical distributive consequences. Quality standards are mechanisms of economic governance that are used in the trade of a vast array of commodities, from bulk agricultural goods like cotton or wheat to sophisticated electronic goods or fine wines. In· deed, some estimates suggest that up to So percent of trade is affected by standards or associated technical regulations (Mattli 2001b). Standards do, however, take particular form in relation to specific commodities. Cotton is highly heterogeneous, and the differences in the material characteristics of different types of cotton matter because they influence processing. That is, the material characteristics of cotton influence how cotton fibers are spun into yam and woven or knit into textiles. Raw material is the most impor· tant factor influencing yam quality, and represents about 50 percent of the cost of yam (Estur 2004b ). Quality is thus the main source of differentiation in end-markets (Larsen 2003), and knowing the quality of the cotton one is buying or selling is key to profitability. The governance of quality standards involves three key tasks (see Ta· ble 1.2). The first is defining quality. This involves determining what char· acteristics of the cotton should be evaluated to determine its price and establish grades, or the categories used to implement the standards. This is a contentious task as different actors, from Chinese textile manufacturers 
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TABLE 1.2. Key Tasks and Axes of Conflict in the Governance of Cotton Quality Standards. 
Key Governance Tasks 




Determining which characteristics of cotton should be evaluated 
in establishing grades and thus price 
Creating physical representations of the "true" value of the grades 
which are used as a basis of co mparison in manual classification or 
to calibrate measurement instruments in automated classification 
Adjudicating a conflict over quality and technical terms in a 
contract 
and large cotton producers in the United States to transnational merchants 
and small cotton producers in Benin, have different interests in how quality 
should be defined. The second task is the creation of benchmark standards.
Benchmark standards are physical representations of the "true" value of 
the different grades or categories. This is considered a critical coordinating 
function as it is subject to considerable manipulation and serves as the basis 
for classification and dispute settlement. When cotton is classed for sale on 
the market, it is compared with these benchmark standards to determine 
its quality and price. The final task is dispute settlement. If a merchant ships 
cotton from Benin to China and the Chinese buyer argues that the cotton 
delivered was not what she ordered, who will settle the dispute, authori­
tatively determine the quality of the cotton, and enforce this definition? 
Historically, the settlement of quality disputes has been intrinsically linked 
with the governance of contracts more broadly and thus rules for "quality 
terms" in a contract have often been elaborated in conjunction with rules 
for "technical terms," such as who will be responsible for storage, transpor­
tation, and insurance or how payment will be made. 
These tasks for the governance of quality standards must be conducted 
regardless of whether trade in cotton occurs within a face-to-face market 
or clear across the globe. However, these tasks and the social relationships 
that they embody can take distinct form in different locations, at different 
historical moments, and in relation to the changing economic organiza­
tion of trade. As we will see in the subsequent chapters, these three gover­
nance tasks have also been the key axes of struggle over quality standards
throughout history. 
I consider negotiations over these governance tasks from 1970 to 2012
in comparison with a sinillar struggle over quality standards that occurred 
from 1870 to the 1920s. As we will see, negotiations over these forms of 
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economic governance are conflictual because who makes the rules matters. 
Whoever can successfully claim authority over quality standards has con­
siderable influence over how the benefits of trade are distributed. As Tim 
Biithe and Walter Mattli explain, struggles over standards matter for firms 
and states as "to lose may mean higher production costs, steeper costs of 
switching to international standards, lower international competitiveness, 
loss of export markets, and even risk of corporate demise" (2on:ll), And 
for weaker actors, such as small farmers in West Africa, to lose may mean 
greater livelihood instability-greater difficulty sending one's children to 
school and putting food on the table. 
RESEARCH STRATEGY 
The research forming the core of the book captures the years following two 
critical turning points in the cotton trade: the shift to liberalized trade in the 
apparel sector with the end of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) in 200) 
and the accession of China to the wro in 2001, which together created 
an increasingly transnational but China-centered cotton trade. This book 
follows key actors-transnational and regional merchants, government of­
ficials, fiber scientists, contract lawyers and arbitrators, and trade associa­
tion representatives -from countries around the globe as they navigate this 
new trading environment and negotiate new global rules to govern their 
transactions. 
When I describe my research on the cotton trade to family, friends, and 
other scholars, I am commonly asked, what region or country did you focus 
on? This question reflects what continues to be a deeply embedded meth­
odological nationalism in social scientific research -that is, our tendency to 
frame research, even research on transnational processes, in nation-state­
centric terms. This is not to say that nation-states are no longer pertinent 
to study. Indeed, the chapters of this book will repeatedly refer to states 
and state agencies and their roles in transnational governance. Overcoming 
methodological nationalism means not seeing nation-states as containers 
for social activities. 
To move beyond methodological nationalism in the study of trans­
national processes, we need to demarcate transnational space as our area 
of focus. To this end, I used the global commodity chain (GCC) approach 
as a methodological tool to track actors that are at once linked in the global
cotton trade and embedded in place-specific constellations oflabor, technol­
ogy, materiality, science, culture, and discourse (see Collins 200;; Gereffi
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1994). Hopkins and Wallerstein (1977, 1986) first introduced the concept of 
the commodity chain as an alternative to the methodological nationalism 
that characterized much research at that time. The commodity chain is de­
fined as "a network oflabor and production processes whose end result is a 
finished commodity'' (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1986:159). The commodity 
chain represents a useful analytical tool to study global standard-setting by 
helping one trace the relationships among diverse actors involved in the 
sector for which the standards are being made. As Jane Collins explains, 
commodity chains can help one "grasp the evolving organizational aspects 
of international trade, the linkages that animate it, the coordination that 
makes it possible and the new global bodies that regulate it'' (2005:4). 
In particular, commodity chains can be used to facilitate Philip Mc­
Michael's (1990, 2000) "incorporating comparisons" historical compara­
tive method for studying the capitalist world-system. McMichael argues 
that by comparing the subparts of the world-system, an understanding of 
the world-system as a whole emerges. McMichael suggests that such com­
parisons can occur along two axes: space and time. Cross-time compari­
sons assume that any era in the history of the world-system can be thought 
of as consisting of particular historical instances or moments that can be 
compared. Cross-space comparisons, on the other hand, involve comparing 
subparts in spatially specific locations of a global configuration. McMichael 
suggests that comparison along either of these axes is sufficient; however, 
creative combinations of the two are preferred. 
The commodity chain serves as a unit of analysis through which to fa­
cilitate cross-time and cross-space comparisons. My research methodology 
involved cross-time comparisons as I compare contemporary negotiations 
within the commodity chain with those from the 1870s to the 1920s. As 
well, I compare social relationships along the commodity chain at differ­
ent points in time within each of these periods. My research also involved 
cross-space comparisons. Using the GCC methodology, I sought to capture 
variation both w ithin different nodes of the commodity chain and across 
different geographic locations. I collected and analyzed three main types of 
data guided by this sampling strategy. First, I conducted document analysis 
of news articles, annual reports, minutes from meetings, and policy docu­
ments. Second, I analyzed descriptive statistics on changes in cotton pro­
duction, consumption, and trade globally from 1970 to present from a data 
set obtained from the International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC).
Finally, I used a multisited ethnographic research strategy (Collins 2003). 
This involved conducting approximately 80 semistructured interviews, as
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well as observation at four international cotton industry conferences: the 
200, and 2006 annual meetings of the ICAC and the 2005' and 2006 an­
nual meetings of the International Cotton Association (ICA). These confer­
ences brought together state and private sector representatives from cotton­
producing and -consuming countries around the world. 
My sampling strategy for interviews aimed to maximize potential diver­
sity among actors in terms of their interests and roles in standard-setting. 
To this end, I interviewed actors in each of the key nodes or positions 
within the cotton trade: cotton producers, transnational and local cotton 
merchants, and yam/textile manufacturers, as well as representatives from 
trade associations representing these actors (see Figure 1.1). I also sought to 
maximize geographical diversity by interviewing actors during field visits 
to China, Benin, and the United States, as well as during the cotton in­
dustry conferences I attended in Brazil and England. However, these firms 
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INTRODUCTION 33 with a range of other actors, such as states, lawyers, and scientists, who also intervene in standard-setting processes. To capture these actors, I fur­ther interviewed government officials, fiber scientists, lawyers, arbitrators, and various firms that provide services to the cotton trade (e.g., inspection 
firms, shipping firms, insurance firms). This research strategy was critical not only for capturing institutional change over time through cross-time comparisons but also for capturing di­verse axes of conflict. I was able to examine divergent interests in standard­setting between actors at more dominant or powerful nodes of the com­modity chain, such as transnational cotton merchants, and those in more marginalized nodes, such as cotton producers. It allowed me to trace the patterns of social conflict between actors within the same node, such as between cotton producers in the United States versus those in West African countries. And finally, it oriented me toward struggles between powerful 
firms and states, in both competitive and client-based relationships, such as the struggle between Chinese textile manufacturers and transnational merchants and between the US and Chinese states. 
OUTLINE OF THE BOOK The chapters of the book explore struggles over quality standards in the global cotton trade. As I trace these struggles, I aim to demonstrate how contestation over specific institutions, such as cotton quality standards, must be understood as constituted by and constitutive of broader conflicts in the organization of the global capitalist system. Actors' preferences, bar­gaining power, and institutional strategies in these struggles reflect their position within the dynamics of global capitalist development unleashed by liberal market projects. And these conflict-driven institutional strategies generate new, hybrid institutions. Chapter 2 begins the analysis by turning to an earlier period of globaliza­tion from the 1870s to the 1920s. This chapter demonstrates how episodesof institutional change are best understood when situated within broadermaterial and discursive struggles over the organization of the global capital­ist system. Merchants from Liverpool constructed their private authority over quality standards and dispute settlement as part of a broader project of British-led market liberalism in the 1870s. While this liberal market proj­ect remade the cotton trade in its image to a significant degree, it also un­leashed the creative and destructive dynamics of capitalism and generatedboth new rivals and marginalized actors, particularly in the United States,
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who sought to challenge these governance institutions. These challenges 
brought a conflict-driven process of institutional change. Rivals such as the 
US state remained dependent on the Liverpool standards and thus needed 
to master the existing standards before pursuing a redirection strategy to 
recast them to reflect their preferences. This institutional dependence en­
sured that the process of institutional change unfolded incrementally. As 
challenges to the Liverpool standards grew in intensity, Liverpool mer­
chants were compelled to pursue a preservation strategy to reconstitute the 
rules in ways that would appease challengers while retaining their insti­
tutional privileges. The resulting institutions were thus hybrid in nature 
as the product of the iterative and competitive reconstitution of the rules. 
Ultimately, the broader shift in the balance of economic and political power 
toward the United States aided the US state in securing control over quality 
standards, if in a hybrid governance arrangement that integrated Liverpool 
merchants in an oversight role. The United States replaced private standards for economic liberalism with national standards for embedded liberalism that 
nonethdess preserved private authority over dispute settlement. In sum, 
institutional change was a process shaped by path dependencies, strategic 
efforts on the part of actors, and their embeddedness in broader, historically 
specific processes of capital accumulation on a world scale. 
In chapter 3, I turn to the contemporary struggle over quality standards. 
This chapter demonstrates that projects to create new institutions are of­
ten trial-and-error, ad hoc efforts, as institutionalist scholars suggest, but 
they are also driven by competitive efforts to shape the terrain of market 
competition. Actors create new institutions to solve the problems they face 
given their historically and spatially specific position within patterns of 
capital accumulation. The chapter begins by tracing the rise of a US-led 
liberal market project in the 1970s and the efforts of the US state and tranS· 
national merchants to recast quality standards and dispute settlement to 
privilege their preferences in this liberalizing environment. As the textile 
and apparel trade became increasingly global, a new US cotton classifica­
tion system became the de facto global system. However, it was also met 
with skepticism given the patterns of conflict that emerged in response to
the United States' liberal market project. The United States' project was 
seen as a highly uneven liberalization project that required countries in 
the global South to liberalize markets while the United States continued to 
protect its textile and cotton producers from market discipline. At the same 
time, US and European merchants took advantage of market liberalization 
to extend their cotton supply and distribution networks, as well as their 
private authority over dispute settlement, on a global scale. Yet, while trans· 
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national merchants gained greater power to impose the rules of the game, 
they also faced limits to the enforceability of their preferred rules. Particu­
larly in a context of growing inequality between trade partners, merchants' 
private authority over dispute settlement was contingent on the support 
of states and a transformation in states' organizing logics to serve transna­
tional firms rather than domestic cotton producers or textile manufacturers. 
In this chapter, we see how actors searched for institutional arrangements 
that solved particular problems or helped them pursue new opportunities 
given their particular positions within the US liberal market project. At the 
same time, the efficacy of these institutions was limited by the patterns of 
conflict that they generated. 
Chapter 4 focuses on a critical turning point in the struggle over quality 
standard s and dispute settlement mechanisms: the creation of the World 
Trade Organization (WrO). The wro transformed the dynamics of struggle 
in the cotton trade in three key ways. First, it intensified the creative and de­
structive dynamics of the US liberal market project Perhaps most decisively, 
this created the conditions for China to ascend to a dominant position in the 
cotton trade. Three kings of cotton became rivals for rule-making power: 
the Chinese state, the US state, and transnational merchants. Second, these 
shifting competitive positions crystallized both a redirection strategy on the 
part of the Chinese state to reconstitute the rules of the game in its favor and 
a protection strategy by marginalized cotton producers against the power of 
US firms, producers, and the state. The Chinese state, as well as more mar­
ginalized actors, saw US quality standards and merchants' dispute settle­
ment mechanisms as globalized localisms that cast rules designed to serve 
the preferences of US cotton producers and textile manufacturers onto the 
transnational stage and created disadvantageous institutional incongruities 
given the different social, cultural, legal, material, and technological condi­
tions in their countries. Finally, the creation of the wro shifted the logic 
of decision making over standards and dispute settlement. The Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) narrowed the debate over standards
through a commitment to base decisions on science and market integration 
rather than the socioeconomic and distributive implications of standards 
and technical regulations. At the same time, China's accession to the WTO 
limited the role of the state in the economy and generated new challenges 
for both China and transnational merchants in negotiations over dispute
settlement. 
In chapter 5, I demonstrate why we should expect conflict-driven pro­
cesses of institutional change to inevitably be incremental in nature. Emerg­
ing rivals remain dependent on existing arrangements even as they pursue
36 CHAPTER ONE redirection strategies to reconstitute them in their favor. China emerged as a powerful rival in part due to the United States' liberal market project and the institutions-from quality standards to the wro-that facilitated it. Yet, in its redirection strategy to retool existing rules, the Chinese state found itself dependent not only on aspects of the existing standards and dispute settlement rules but also on the broader institutional framework at the WTO that shaped how rules could be made. This institutional de­pendence made the Chinese state's redirection strategy necessarily focused on incremental changes as it first had to master the existing arrangements before trying to introduce changes. Thus, through its redirection strategy, the Chinese state sought to import and imitate institutional forms from the United States as a way to solve the problems of institutional dependence and institutional incongruities and ultimately overtake these institutions. Chapter 6 reveals why conflict-driven processes of institutional change result in new arrangements that are inevitably hybrid. Facing challenges from both rival and marginalized actors, dominant actors are compelled to retool institutional arrangements in an effort to preserve their institutional privileges and stabilize existing rules. Indeed, we see that the USDA and transnational merchants launched preservation strategies that aimed to re­constitute the institutional arrangements in ways that would both appease challengers and maintain their institutional privileges. Institutional change thus results in hybrid arrangements as even dominant actors participate in the reconstruction of rules and contribute to a process of track-switching, or the redirecting of these institutions along a new path-dependent trajectory, Finally,the concluding chapter discusses the implications of this analysis of shifting quality standards and dispute settlement mechanisms for broader debates in the literatures on institutional change and the governance of the global economy. Drawing on comparisons with the historical standards war at the tum of the twentieth century and with other cases of Chinese standard-setting, this chapter demonstrates that specific instances of insti­tutional change must be understood as constituted by and constitutive of broader transformations in the organization of the global capitalist system, Conflicts over the rules of the game in the cotton trade can be understood as reflecting and instantiating the shift from a British-led to a US-led hege­monic coalition, as well as the potential rise of a new hegemonic coalition in which both China and transnational firms are likely to play prominent roles. A theory of institutional change in the global capitalist system thus sheds light on the broader competitive dynamics and power relations that shape who will set the rules of the game into the future. 
